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1G	 Abstract
This document reports results of a survey and analysis of current research and
development work in the U.S.A. related to improving transport airplane flight deck
equipment and aircrew performance. This survey and analysis was performed for the
NASA Langley Research Center's Terminal Configured Vehicle(TCV) program, which
was established to study, test, and evaluate concepts for more efficient and more
acceptable terminal-area transport operations. Research and development related to
flight deck advancement in general, as well as that concerned directly with
terminal-area operations, is described and discussed. Specific recommendations are
made for future TCV program work in flight deck development, based on survey results.
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1.0 SUMMARY
The NASA Langley Research Center Terminal Configured Vehicle (TCV) program has
been established to develop, evaluate, and demonstrate systems and procedures for more
efficient and acceptable transport aircraft operations approaching and within terminal
areas.
One task of the TCV dram was to conduct a survey and analysis of flight deck
related research and de-,,.opment being conducted elsewhere in the U.S. The object of
this task was to establish a base and context for future TCV program flight deck
research aimed at optimizing the aircrew-aircraft interface,
A summary and discussion of survey data and its analysis with respect to TCV goals
and objectives is presented herein, followed by recommendations for program action.
Specific recommendations, are made for:
•	 Documentation of activity
•	 Control/display concept development
•	 Advanced control/display system performance assessment
•	 Visual approach monitor and head-up display evaluation
•	 Tactile display evaluation
•	 Cockpit displayed traffic information analysis and test
•	 Keyboard reconfiguration
•	 Workload evaluation and validation
•	 Stereo display evaluation
•	 Imaging sensor evaluation
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
The broad objectives of the Terminal Configured Vehicle (TCV) program are to provide
improvements in airborne systems (avionics and air vehicle) and in operational flight
procedures for:
•	 Reducing weather minima
•	 Reducing noise
•	 Saving fuel
•	 Increasing air traffic controller productivity
•	 Increasing airport and airway capacity
•	 Improving approach and landing safety
The program involves analyses, simulation, and flight studies using a modified Boeing
737 (B-737) airplane. The TCV B-737 has two operational flight decks, one forward
(FFD) and one aft (AFD), as shown in figure 1. The AFD, shown in detail in figure 2, is
equipped with highly flexible display and control equipment. During research
operations, the airplane is flown from the AFD. Safety pilots in the FFD monitor all
maneuvers and can take control at any time.
M + ,
Figure 1.—TCV B-737 General Arrangement
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Figure 2.—Aft Flight Deck
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The objective of the program task reported herein was to establish a data base of flight
deck related research and development and, based on this information, to make
recommendations for future program research on controls, displays, and aircrew
procedures. The task was accomplished by means of a comprehensive survey of other
organizations engaged in appropriate R&D, and a concurrent analysis of survey data
with respect to the objectives and capabilities of the TCV program.
The survey was initiated by making telephone contact with individuals working in
areas such as cockpit design, controlldisplay development, and aviation human factors
research, Some of these individuals were known at the outset, and others were
suggested by persons contacted as the survey progressed. Approximately 120 individuals
were contacted, representing 10 universities, 20 government/military offices, and
40 private companies. Organizations and individuals are listed in the activity and trip
reports on file in the TCV program office.
The approach to each contact was to briefly describe the TCV program, if necessary,
explain the purpose of the survey, and then request information concerning relevant
research and development activities in that person's organization. Approximately half of
the persons contacted had heard of TCV, but most requested a description of the
program and its current status. Fifteen program brochures were mailed or otherwise
delivered to those who requested them. Arrangements were made for personal visits to
those organizations whose activities appeared most relevant to flight deck development.
Nine survey trips were made in which thirteen organizations were reviewed, and four
symposia were attended.
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3.0 ABBREVIATIONS
ADEDS	 Advanced Electronic Display System
AFAL	 Air Force Avionics Laboratory
AFB	 Air Force Base
AFD	 Aft Flight Deck
AFFDL	 Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratr,
AGCS	 Automatic Guidance and Control System
AIDS	 Advanced Integrated Display System
AIMIS	 Advanced Integrated Modular Instrumentation System
AMRL	 Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory
AGA	 Angle of Attack
ASM	 Advanced Systems Monitor
ASW
	
Anti-Submarine Warfare
ATC	 Air Traffic Control
AWACS	 Airborne Warning And Control System
CDTI	 Cockpit Displayed Traffic Information
cm	 Centimeters
CRT	 Cathode Ray Tube
CWS	 Control Wheel Steering
DAIS	 Digital Avionics Information System
DH	 Decision Height
DLC
	
Direct Lift Control
EADI	 Electronic Attitude Director Indicator
EHSI	 Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator
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EKG
EL
FAA
FFD
FLIR
FPA
FRD
GD
HSD
HUD
IFR
ILM
LAS
LCD
LED
LEF
LLLTV
mA
MDA
MIT
AILS
NAS
NASA
NCDU
ONR
Electrocardiogram
Electroluminescence
Federal Aviation Administration
Forward Flight Deck
Forward-Looking Inf ,red
Flight Path Angle
Flight Research Division
Gas Discharge
Horizontal Situation Display
Head-Up Display
Instrument Flight Rules
Independent Landing Monitor
Landing Assessment System
Liquid Crystal Display
Light-Emitting Diode
Light-Emitting Film
Low Light Level Television
Milliamperes
Minimum Descent A]
Massachusetts Institi
Microwave Landing
Naval Air Station
National Aeronautic:
Navigation Control a
Office of Naval Reset
7OSU	 Ohio State University
PAFAM	 Performance and Failure Assessment Monitor
PLZT	 Pb-based Lanthanum-doped ZireiInate Titanate
R&D	 Research and Development
RVR	 Ruaway Visual Range
SAE	 Society of Automotive Engineers
TCV
	
Terminal Configured Vehicle
TCV B-737 TCV Boeing Model 737-100 Aircraft, NASA Designation 515
TLA-2
	
	
Time- Line Analysis Crew Workload Evaluation Computer Program, 2nd
version
TSC	 Transportation Systems Center
TV	 Television
UO3RD ATC Upgraded Third-Generation Air Traffic Control
V	 Volts
VAM	 Visual Approach Monitor
VFR	 Visual Flight Rules
VPI	 Virginia Polytechnic Institute
VRAS	 Voice Recognition and Synthesis
V/STOL	 Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing
4.0 SURVEY AND ANALYSIS	 ,
4.1 GENERAL
Survey data was found to fall into two major categories: (1) that which affects or is
immediately concerned with terminal area operations, and (2) that wl.>dh is applicable
to flight deck development in general, Accordingly, the following discussion is divided
into these two categories.
In general, the survey found relatively little research and development (R&D) activity
aimed specifically at transport flight deck development. The scope and complexity of
military and commercial transport operations has created formidable economic,
technological, and regulatory barriers to the introduction of new controls, displays, and
flight procedures for transport aircraft. These barriers are interrelated and combine to
make economic incentive for independent R&D uncertain at best and long-range in any
case. Transport flight deck R&D is thus largely confined to programs either funded or
performed by government agencies and to independent, long-range work by the major
transport airplane manufacturers.
Other general aspects of flight deck related R&D which emerged in the course of the
survey are;
1. Most genuine human factors research activity addresses very specific, very
fundamental aspects of general human abilities and behavior, Untrained subjects
and relatively simple tasks are necessarily used in this work. Extrapolation and
application of such research results to the complex problems TCV must address is
both difficult and risky.
2. Most developmental activity is aimed at eventual production of a specific end item
for a military or industrial market, and understandably so. In the future time
frame which TCV addresses, the market is predominantly military and most
developmental work is aimed at combat aircraft applications. Commercial aircraft
flight deck developmental work will more likely and perhaps more appropriately be
guided by, rather than provide guidance to, the TCV program.
3, Because transport flight deck R&D is fragmented and oriented to immediate
problems, the field lacks a focal point and a common or unifying long-range
objective. The TCV program has the potential to become the focal point and to
provide long-range objectives for the entire field.
4. Despite an abundance of conferences, symposia, and technical literature, effective
communication among those engaged in or having resources for flight deck R&D
remains a problem. Informal technical interchange is evidently uncommon. A
surprising amount of provincialism exists in many research organizations,
accompanied by apparent lack of interest in "other" R&D activity,
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94.2 'TERMINAL AREA OPERA'T'IONS
4.2.1 GENERAL
The central issue of future terminal area operations, and that which TCV can most
productively address, is the problem of providing the aircrow sufli.aent control and
display capability to either guide or monitor the airplane's progress along a three- or
four-dimensional curved or segmented path to a safe landing. Moreover, the crew must
be capable of performing this task regardless of weather and visibility conditions.
Because the problem of low visibility currently exists for straight-in approaches, it has
received considerably more developmental attention than potential future problems
arising from routine use and performance of complex approach paths,
In this section, a rLiatively short discussion of "piloting" is followed by a longer
discussion of "low-visibility landing", which includes data from work on landing
assessment systems, independent landing monitors, and head-up displays.
Descriptioa of a tactile display device, a novel form of "head-up display," is also
included. Finally, a possible means of aiding coordination with other air traffic is
discussed. This concluding discussion is limited to the concept of a cockpit display of
traffic information (CDTD. No attempt is made to address the counterpart problem of
air traffic control in general.
4.2.2 PILOTING
The task of piloting an airplane through the maneuvers required in terminal-area
operations is one which receives almost continuous attention, but seems not to benefit
appreciably from this attention in terms of improved instrumentation and controls.
Perhaps the last significant improvement in primary flight instrumentation for
transport aircraft was the flight director. The operational improvement in safety which
has occurred in the last decade is largely attributable to new or improved ground-based
landing aids. Some additional improvement is also due to better pilot training and
accumulated pilot experience.
The improvement due to new and improved ground aids underscores the fact that the
pilot's greatest need in the cockpit is a means of quickly and continuously ascertaining
his position and progress in the three-dimensional environment. The steady
improvement due to training and experience indicates that terminal-area maneuvers as
currently performed are neither quickly nor easily learned. Such maneuvers are
particularly difficult under the not infrequent adverse conditions in which they must be
routinely performed.
Terminal-area maneuvering will become even more complex in future operations
involving curved, decelerating, and segmented approaches. Future time navigation
requirements and closer lateral and longitudinal spacing of arriving and departing
airplanes will require not only that the pilot know precisely where he is and where he
is going at any given moment, but also that he be able to very precisely control his
progress.
w I	 _..
The Air Force Flight Dynamics l.aboratory(AFFi)L) recently completed a simulation
study and flight test demonstration, in a T-39, of microwave lending system (MLS)
guided curved and segmented approaches using conventional instrumentation.
Conclusions stated in the published flight test report (ref. 1 are not pnrticularly
revealing, but comments of the pilots who flew the demonstration flights are included in
the report. Pilot comments center principally around the topic of orientation and the
need for improved position/situation information in the more complex MLS profiles.
The AFFFDL program evidently generated some criticism of the MLS as lacking in
guidance information. A subsequent memorandum (ref. 2) points out that displays for
terminal-area navigation and precision path following are inadequate for all landing
systems when curved and segmented approaches are flown. Paraphrasing the memo, it
was the implementation of close-in instrument approaches, rather than the
implementation of MLS, which identified the inadequacy of terminal-area navigation
displays in use today, This difficulty was foresern by an earlier Boeing/AFFDL study of
control/display testing requirements for MLS operations (ref. 3), This study provided a
basis for subsequent Air Force MLS evaluation work using a T-39 airplane.
The AFFDL MLS memorandum refers to TCV, and recommends Air Force evaluation of
a projected path vector on an electronic attitude direction indicator (EADI) for both
horizontal and vertical paths. Although the study showed that curved and segmented
approaches can he flown using MLS guidance and conventional displays, it revealed
that such ap .*ar+;es cannot be flown -curately without improved instrumentation. It
is reasonab , i: to further conclude that safety considerations will preclude use of such
approaches, whether manually or automatically controlled. in daily commercial
operations unless improved position/situation displays and path controls are developed
and proved effective.
Development of such new or improved displays is well within current technology. The
objective of such development should be to provide the pilot an integrated, easily
interpreted representation of his position and progress, not only in the horizontal and
vertical dimensions, but also with respect to a possible speed or time schedule 'the most
promising means of achieving this objective appears to lie in the flexibility .)f electronic
displays for dynamic presentation of information, and the growing capability and
availability of digital processing equipment to perform much of the information
integration and interpretation which the pilot now must perform If the pilot can be
relieved of duties as a data processor, he ran perform more efficiently as a decision
maker and system manager. To complement this advantage, system management
functions, such as subsystem monitoring and checklist operations, can also be assigned
to the processor, thus permitting the pilot to devote more time and attention to primary
control functions.
Many such development efforts are at press at underway in all of the R&D arenas:
military, commercial, and academic. Most of these efforts are basically similar in that
nearly all the display concepts focus upon one or more electronic indicators: a pictorial
horizontal situation display, a vertical guidance display oriented to flight path
angle/velocity vector—either or both displays having, some kind of predictive
capability—and some type of s ystems monitoring concept. All have been somehow
simulated, tested, or evaluated, and work proceeds on any given concept based on
favorable results from whatever was done.
10
r^	 ,^_	
^^
	
^	 f	 I	 I
What is lacking in this area, and what TCV is uniquely capable of providing, are both
(1)a quantitative, comparative assessment of the incremental gain in operational
system performance that could be provided by any particular concept, and
(2) identifiention of specific man-machine interaction problems which occur in the
real-world operational context.
4.2.3 LOW VISIBILITY LANDINiG
The problem of low-visibility landing is difficult to identify in tangible Corms.
Automatic landings in Category IIIA conditions are now permitted by British and
European airlines, and U.S, carrier -based Navy aircraft land automatically in similar
conditions. A French Air Force airplane has made 30 to 40 landings in less than 100 ft
runway visual range (RVR) using a head-up display (ref. 4), and a U.S. Air Force T-39
has been landed repeatedly in the same conditions using little more than
expanded -scale conventional instrumentation (ref, 5), Jimmy Doolittle took off, flew 15
miles, and successfully landed, using instruments only, in 1929 *. So, the problem is not
can it be done or how to do it, but rather how to provide both sufficient and sufficiently
reliable information and control capability so that low-visibility landings may be made
confidently and routinely, either in automatic or under manual control.
An important aspect of low-visibility landing is that of subsequent turnoff and taxi.
Automatic turnoff, to clear the runway, is conceivably possible via some appropriate
sensing, processing, and control system, but automatic turnoff in very low visibility is
likely to be as controversial to U.S. airlines as are automatic landings. Automatic taxi
to the terminal is difficult to imagine as a real requirement in the foreseeable future.
Nonetheless, if the research goal is to achieve zero-visibility landing capability, the
problem of getting the airplane from the runway to the terminal must be considered. (A
concomitant problem is that of enabling ground support vehicles, such as fire trucks, to
operate in zero.%ero conditions.)
A possible solution to the low-visibility landing problem is to provide the pilot a
display, with ussociated sensing and processing equipment, which will give him
sufficient information to land the airplane confidently without need for outside vision.
What information to display and how to display it for this purpose are questions nearly
as old as aviation'it g'elf, and as yet not satisfactorily answered. Even given such a
display system, the pilot might require assurance from some other source that the
system was operating properly.
A similar requirement for pilot assurance was anticipated early in the development of
automatic landing systems. From this now questionable requirement came the idea of
an independent landing monitor (ILM), or more generally, a landing assessment
system (LAS). The ILM concept consists of a display driven either by airborne sensing
and processing components independent of the autoland system, by ground-based
transmitters, or by a combination, such as airborne sensors and ground-based signal
sources. The important feature is that the ILM presents the aircraft's situation
independently; its information should be derived from sources other than the airplane's
primary navigation or guidance system, a. ad it should not depend upon ground-based
*New York Times, September 25, 1929. Headlined "FOG PERM OVERCOME". Story on
Page 1 continued on Page 7.
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finputs to those systems. As usually defined, an ILM need not provide manual takeover
capability for anything beyond aborting the approach. By contrast, a LAS is usually
defined as a system which permits manual execution of approach and landing. To avoid
misunderstanding, the generic term "landing monitor" is used in the following except
where a more precise term is needed,
Most of the R&D relevant to "hend-down" landing displays has been aimed at a landing
monitor application. At least two such systems have been fully developed for
commercial operations, one for the L-1011, the other for the DC-10. Neither is in active
use in the U.S, at present.	 w
For discussion purposes, landing monitor concepts may he divided into three general
categories:
•	 Go - no go indication
•	 Dynamic, symbolic display
•	 Imaging sensor display
Go-No Go
This, the simplest concept, assumes an on-board system which continuously checks the
health and operation of the autoland system and the quality of guidance signal being
received. This approach, in itself, does not provide a manual takeover capability except
to abort and divert. Neither does it provide turnoff and taxi guidance.
Dynamic Symbology
A second approach is to generate symbology, usually an artificial representation of the
external environment, showing the airplane's present relative position and predicted
progress, The performance and failure assessment monitor (PAFAM) is a relatively
simple symbolic landing monitor (ref. G) developed by Honeywell for McDonnell-Douglas
and now standard equipment on new UC-10's. However, most U.S. airline DC-10
customers have either disconnected or removed the units. The reason given by one
airline for removing their PAFAM's is that the unit does not, in their analysis, provide
sufficient additional system capability to justify spares and maintenance costs. This
explanation does not fault the display itself, its intended function is that of an autoland
monitor, and autoland is at dresent available at relatively few airports.
National Airlines has operated PAFAM in an optional manual LAND mode during
Category II operations, and the display is active in their training simulator. Their pilots
like the display and desire it active in the airplanes:" Because PAFAM has a manual
mode, and because the availability of autoland will continue to increase, evaluation of a
PAFAM on the TCV B-737 might provide valuable information relevant to both TCV
program goals and near-future airline operations.
*National recently deactivated their PAFAM's for reasons not related to the PAFAM
itself.
12
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A more sophisticated symbolic landing display is an EADI landing format developed at
Langley Research Center and tested in both the TCV simulator and airplane. The
format features a runway symbol having perspective in both range and azimuth,
velocity vector, and other symbology. All symbology overlays and registers with the
actual runway as seen by forward-looking TV, when visibility permits. Simulator tests
of the format (ref. 7) showed improved pilot performance in achieving alinement with
the runway. Flight tests in the TCV B-737 are currently in progress.
Earlier tests at Boeing of a perspective runway landing monitor concept showed that
(1) the runway perspective alone was clearly insufficient, and (2) although performance
improved markedly with the addition of symbology, pilots were never able to make
consistently accurate judgements of approach "quality" at a decision height of 100 ft
(ref. 8). Follow-on flight tests of the concept (ref. 9) showed an even greater variability
in performance due to signal interference not present in the simulation. Obviously, pilot
acceptance of a symbolic display would depend upon the source and reliability of the
signals and equipment used to drive the display, as well as the amount of information
available from the symbology.
A symbolic display might also be used for turnoff and taxi, given an external guidance
system on the taxiways, but the idea seems impractical. Of the three general
approaches to a landing monitor, the symbolic display is the only one appropriate for
evaluation on the TCV B-737 because it can be tested in good weather and without
intentionally disabling the guidance system to achieve unsatisfactory indications,
Imaging Sensor Display
The third and probably most expensive landing monitor concept is that of providing
imaging sensors and a sensor display on the airplane to show the pilot what is on the
ground. Radar and forward-looking infrared (FLIR) are the two most likely sensors for
such a system, and each has the disadvantage of being attenuated by different types of
fog and precipitation, thus limiting their overall utility. Both offer good resolution
under most conditions, FLIR is attenuated most by heavy, wet fog, and radar by heavy
rain.
An ILM that used a Texas Instruments Ka-band radar was developed for the L-1011 but
was not purchased by any L-1011 customer. An improved version of this ILM has been
flight tested by AFFDL in a KC-135. Results of this evaluation, not yet published,
indicate that the radar is an effective sensor for all kinds of runways in nearly all kinds
of weather.
As expected, test results show that heavy rain attenuates the signal; however, an
unanticipated and possibly more serious effect is that standing water evidently causes a
loss in discriminability. The ILM has a t15-deg scan, a 4-mile viewing range, and
approximately 200 ft short-range limitation. Resolution is said to be sufficient for
taxiing, but the sector size scanned would have to be increased. Trucks and other metal
objects intentionally placed on runways appeared on the radar before the runway did.
People on the ground and even birds could be seen on the display.
13
Texas Instruments has considered combining a Ka-band radar with airline weather
radar, but this idea is not at present being pursued.
A FLIR system developed by Hughes for the Air Force was later tested by Hughes and
Boeing, Wichita, as a possible Boeing 747 ILM candidate (ref. 10). Ground tests showed
that the system provided two to ten times the visual range of the eye in various types of
haze and fog (ref. 11). A second test of the system was planned for this year, but has
been indefinitely postponed,
Experience with the B-62 indicates that the FLIR could provide guidance for turnoff and
taxi, but it is unlikely that such a display could provide enough information for
confident landing. This characteristic is not unique to FLIR, however, Two-dimensional,
TV-type displays in general have up to now been unsatisfactory as primary landing
displays (refs. 8 and 12). Landings can and have been made using a TV display (refs. 13
and 14), but the technique is still experimental, In any case, an imaging sensor system
is not anonable to testing on the TCV B-737. Such testing would require making
approaches in actual lower-than-minimum visibility in which the safety factor provided
by the front cockpit would be lost.
Two other possibilities for imaging sensor display development, both of which would add
to system cost, are (1) a multisensor system with integrated sensor information, and
(2) three-dimensional display. Westinghouse has tested a combined low-light-level
television (LLLTV) and FLIR system in which the individual sensor signals are
processc;'s so that they are complementary, rather than superimposed (ref. 15.) To
further enhance the image quality, artificial color was added in some tests as a means
of edge sharpening. For target detection and recognition, the color-enhanced display
proved better than either of the sensors singly, with or without color, or combined in
monochrome.
Both RCA and Honeywell have developed three-dimensional TV viewing systems using
electrically controlled PLZT optical filters installed in special lightweight goggles
similar to sunglasses. The polarized lenses are electro-optically rotated by the PUT at
the TV field rate to alternately block the view of each eye, thus permitting the viewer
to see two images as one stereo image. The advantages of the PUT approach over other
methods are that (1) it can be used with either color or monochrome displays, and
(2) the viewer can look away from the display for other purposes without suffering
distorted vision. The lenses do attenuate vision, however, as do dark sunglasses (refs. 16
and 17).
It would be interesting to discover whether or not a three-dimensional image would
increase pilot confidence in landing using a TV display. Factors such as inter-camera
spacing and focal points would have to be worked out first. Resolution of these factors
and the actual evaluation are almost necessarily flight tests, because the technique
would be difficult to simulate realistically. The application could be to either a symbolic
or a sensor display, but it seems more appropriate for an actual picture.
14
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Several efforts to develop a head-down landing display as such, not n landing monitor,
were found in the survey. The first is the EADI perspective runway format discussed
earlier. In addition, a path-in-the-sky format for the EAUI is under experimental
development at Langley Research Center. This display is gust now being readied for
simulator evaluation.
A head -down, path - in-the - sky display for carrier landing was successfully demonstrated
in simulation at Pacific Missile Test Center ( ref. 18). The display showed a flight path
corridor and a carrier symbol. The simulation was of an FA airplane, hilt did riot
include carrier dynamics.
Work oil predictive symbolic concept is proceeding at the Aviation Research
Laboratorv. University of Illinois. ( One such format is shown in fig. 3, taken from
rel'. 12.s Figure 3 shows the airplane banked to the right, low and to the left of' the
glideslope. The successi , . v smaller airplane symbols show that the pilot has made the
proper control input to pul: up and roll left to bring the airplane to the desired
touchdown point. The concept has not yet been tested in simulation.
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Figure 3.—Computer-Generated Contact Analog Display With
Fast-Time Predictive Fliyht Path Projection
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4.2.4 HEAD-UP DISPLAYS
The head-up display (HUD) is now the primary flight display on new military combat
aircraft, i.e., the F-14, -15, -16, and -18. Because these aircraft are new, and because
preceding head-up displays, such as that on the A-7, were primarily for weapon
delivery, little or no evaluation has been recorded for these HUD's as low-visibility
landing displays. Operational information of this nature may be expected in the future,
however, as these new airplanes are forced to fly into bad weather.
Theoretically, the HUD permits the pilot to monitor essential instruments and to look
for the ground without having to either move his head up and down or refocus his eyes.
The information on the HUD is collimated and thus "focused at infinity.- There is some
question whether or not collimation is necessary, and this question is now being
experimentally evaluated at Pensacola Naval Air Station. In the F-15, HUD collimation
forces the pilot to move his head slightly from side to side in order to a'ternately view
airspeed and altitude scales on either side of the display. In addition, the pilot must
look up, rather than down, to check the heading scale at the top of t1le HUD, On the
F-14, the HUD and canopy configuration causes undesirable reflections, particularly at
night. The display is not currently used for landing, because pilots position themselves
above the design eye point prior to approach, and in this position cannot see the display.
The principal argument for the HUD as a lore-visibility landing aid is that it permits a
how-goes-it approach to decision height rather than forcing the pilot to look up and
make a snap decision at decision height/minimum descent altitude (DH/MDA). This
argument is not entirely applicable to commercial aircraft, where the usual procedure is
for one pilot to remain on instruments while the other alternately checks instruments
and looks out. While this procedure is basically sound, review of short-landing accidents
and premature ground strikes reveals that, when visibility is borderline or spotty, both
pilots sometimes yield to the temptation to look for the runway, and thereby let the
airplane get away from them (refs. 10 and 20).
There are evidently a number of subtle aspects to use of head-up displays. A
characteristic pattern in the military is for pilots to dislike the I-IUD initially and use it
very little. As the display is used, however, they become advocates. This transition is
often described as "unconscious," and a common remark is something like "I didn't
realize how much I depended on the HUD until it failed just as I was. . .".
An evaluation of the Sundstrand Visual Approach Monitor (VAM), a relatively austere
HUD, was performed by AFFDL with a C-5 airplane (ref. 21). The evaluation concluded
that pilots must be trained to use the VAM, and revealed that piloting technique varies
depending on whether the display is used as a monitor or as a director; an apparently
self-evident statement, but intended to describe a subtle effect. The VAM evaluation
also concluded that the display was not useful in low visibility because of difficulty in
transitioning from the display to the real world after breakout. Its greatest utility,
according to the report, was in cases where the pilot could see the ground but had no
good horizon reference. In defense of the VAM, it must be noted that (1) the display was
an early model, (2) the Air Force significantly modified the display, and (3) installation
problems on the C-5 affected the evaluation negatively.
Other general arguments against the HUD include limited field of view and a cluttered
format which can actually obscure visual cues rather than assist in acquiring them.
Less tangible objections are (1)the display can be very compelling and may "fascinate"
the pilot, and (2) when the visual field is homogeneous, the eyes involuntarily focus at
about arm's length; thus, the pilot really can't look for the ground at all until it comes
into view, at which time he must refocus his eyes anyway. On the other hand, if the
visual field is homogeneous, focusing on collimated HUD iL formation may be the only
way to enable the pilot to see through the fog.
The most recent published test of a HUD was for VISTOL landing in the CL-84
airplane. Results are said to be ambiguous, and at any rate would be difficult to
extrapolate to airline operations. The current Pensacola tests are not intended to reveal 	 w
more than the effect of collimation. Hughes' "diffraction optics" HUD (ref. 22) will be
flight tested in 15 to 18 months, but it is not known whether these tests will include
low-visibility approach and landing.
It appears unlikely that any compelling evidence or rationale either for or against a
commercial transport HUD will soon be forthcoming until it has undergone a
well-designed evaluation program. Such an evaluation would require closed-loop visual
simulation in which differing visibility conditions could be realistically represented, and
different approaches could be flown, As a first step toward the evaluation, the
requirements for such a simulation study should be identified, and the capability of
LRC simulators should be evaluated with respect to these requirements.
The utility of installing a HUD on the TCV B-737 for actual low-visibility evaluation
appears doubtful, though a HUD vendor has indicated possible support in providing
hardware. If installed in the forward flight deck, only VPR evaluations could be made,
If installed in the aft flight deck, only zero-zero conditions-not a realistic HUD
role-could be studied. An evaluation of the HUD as an aid in genuine low-visibility
conditions thus could not be made within the scope of the current TCV program,
Perhaps the most profitable HUD-related endeavor for TCV would be evaluation of the
VAM. The forward flight deck is configured to accept tht; VAM, and the manufacturer,
Sunstrand Corp., has indicated willingness to provide both !hardware and technical
support for a VAM evaluation. Additional support may be available from ARRDL where
there is interest in use of the VAM for two-segment approaches. Although the
evaluation would not be immediately relevant to the low-visibility landing problem,
experience gained in using the VAM would be valuable toward identifying requirements
for a full HUD evaluation program.
4.2.5 TACTILE DISPLAY
A tactile display which can be driven by any appropriate signal has been developed at
Ohio State University (OSU, refs. 23 and 24). The device is a servo-driven metal
cylinder which, as currently configured, fits into the left handgrip of the cockpit control
yoke. At its null position, the ends of the cylinder are flush with the contour of the grip.
The cylinder moves fore and aft within the grip to indicate or command an increase or
decrease in the driving variable, angle-of-attack (AOA). The display has been shown to
significantly reduce the time required to teach student pilots to land.
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By its naturo, the device is best suited to command information or error presentation
where a specific and desired null state can be defined. Though it is currently used as an
AOA command, it could be implemented to command any single-dimensional parameter
such as airspeed, flight path angle (FPA), or even direct lift control (DLC). The
potential advantage of the device for experienced pilots is that the display can provide a
continuous qualitative indication in a relatively unused sensory channel, thus
unburdening the visual channel by at least one parameter. Its role and utility for
experienced pilots has not been assessed at OSU. A two-axis device is being designed,
but initial evaluation of the existing single-axis device would be simpler and perhaps
more revealing.
4.2.6 CDTI
The cockpit-displayed traffic information (CDTD concept consists of an electronic
horizontal situation display (EHSI) in the cockpit on which other air traffic can be
displayed to the aircrew. The basic premise, based in part on results of simulation
studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the NASA-Ames, in
conjunction with Tufts University, is that the pilot can contribute significantly to the
efficiency of certain airline operations, particularly terminal area operations, if he has
such a display. The concept is many-faceted and very complex, giving rise to questions
involving virtually all aspects of current and future terminal area operations, not; the
least of which is legal liability for accidents.
The Boeing Company, under direction of the Transportation Systems Center (TSC) and
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and sponsored by the TCV program, has
recently completed a CDTI role feasibility study (ref. 25), in which potential benefits
were analyzed and a test and evaluation program outlined. The fundamental question
concerning CDTI is whether it might be more of a liability than an asset to safe and
efficient operations. It is feared that pilots might find the display fascinating, and
neglect other instruments; or initiate frequent and usually needless communications
with ATC to question the intent of other airplanes; or disrupt a complicated, but
carefully coordinated, flow of traffic by taking independent action based on
misinterpretation of the situation.
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Because of these potential problems, one general recommendation of the Boeing study is
that "future simulation and testing be done in a realistic traffic situation and ATC
environment to preclude misleading conclusions that simpler testing can promote." In
individual role-test recommendations, it is further stated that both hazardous and safe
but apparently hazardous situations must be simulated. Because the concept is
potentially dangerous, evaluation of its weaknesses, not just its strengths, should be the
object of future testing.
4.3 GENERAL FLIGHT DECK DEVELOPMENT
General flight deck development comprises controls and displays for secondary tasks,
such as subsystems monitoring and navigation or communications input and output.
These tasks interact both directly and indirectly with primary flight tasks, directly by
requiring periodic, flight-related aircrew actions, and indirectly by imposing general
housekeeping and caretaking duties performed on a time-available basis. As discussed
in section 4.2.2, a major objective of primary control/display development must be to
unburden the aircrew and thus provide additional time and opportunity for systems
management. Similarly, a major goal of general flight deck development must be to
provide the aircrew the greatest possible facility for understanding and controlling the
overall situation of their airborne system.
As in piloting, the greatest potential for general flight deck development appears to lie
in the application of onboard processing equipment to achieve an integrated,
system-oriented design. Integration of subsystem control and display functions at the
processor level is a difficult concept, however, because (1) there are a large number and
wide variety of individual parameters, (2) each parameter has significance of its own,
and (3)the significance to the system of any particular parameter varies as an often
complex function of other parameters. Because of these properties, subsystem control
and display development tends to proceed piecewise on a subsystem level, and the
interpretation and integration of subsystem parameters with respect to the total system
is left to the aircrew.
Recent and current developmental efforts, focused upon centralizing subsystem control
and display provisions on a single time-shared panel, are more accurately described as
consolidation, rather than integration. Given a digital avionics system, however, a
further step toward integration is possible in that single data inputs or requests can be
made to the central processor, which then either supplies or retrieves the data to or
from all relevant subsystems. Barometric pressure, for example, must at present be set
and verified in no less than seven separate locations in some wide body transport
cockpits, a result primarily of postdesign requirements for add-on and backup systems.
How to achieve continuous and accurate interpretation of subsystem parameters by a
processor, and the most effective means of subsystem information presentation, are
areas which require work. True integration of subsystem functions with respect to the
aircrew interface is meaningful perhaps only for accomplishing or verifying changes in
system configuration, i.e., system mode change via a single switch operation. This
concept basically implies automatic performance and verification of checklist functions,
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4,3.1 CAUTION AND WARNING SYSTEM
Boeing is currently conducting a study for the FAA of cockpit caution and warning
systems. Related efforts are also being pursued by the NASA-Ames and by the Society
of Automotive Engineers (SAE) S-7 Committee on cockpit displays and controls.
McDonnell-Douglas and Lockheed are scheduled to be involved in forthcoming program
phases involving human factors tests of alerting system concepts, The ultimate objective
of the program is to provide design standards for cockpit alerting systems.
A concurrent internal effort at Boeing is a study of time and criticality factors
associated with various types and combinations of subsystem failures. The intent of this
study is to develop an underlying theory applicable to the design of any caution and
warning system. Caution and warning concepts are not attractive candidates for
airborne test and evaluation due to possible conflict or confusion with actual, instead of
simulated, problems. New caution and warning concepts may be candidates for
implementation, however, when or if an extensive TCV cockpit reconfiguration is made.
4.3.2 SYSTEMS MONITOR
The Advanced Systems Monitor (ASM), developed by Boeing in cooperation with
Teledyne, will be flight tested during the coming year on Boeing's 720B airplane.
Similar systems are under development for the Navy Advanced Integrated Display
System (AIDS) and the Air Force Digital Avionics Information System (DAIS)
programs. Test and operational data concerning display formats and system functional
requirements should be forthcoming from all three sources.
It is inevitable that an electronic display of systems status and an associated
monitoring subsystem will come to commercial aircraft, for any number of interrelated
reasons, such as:
1. Continuous dedicated display of systems parameters is not necessary, and in some
cases is undesirable.
2. Continuous automatic monitoring and selective automatic display of
out-of-tolerance parameters in a single, fixed location offers obvious advantages for
recognition of and reaction to system faults.
3. With a digital avionics system, such as AIDS and DAIS, conventional display of
systems data is impractical.
4. Even without a digital avionics system, electronic displays can be significantly
more economical than conventional indicators (ref, 26).
Integration of the systems monitor with the cockpit caution and warning system is also
an obvious eventuality, but such integration will probably proceed slowly. The
integrated system will require development and implementation of digital sensors and
actuators, and will be initially expensive to install. For these reasons, a systems
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monitor is not recommended for flight test on 516, but like the caution and warning
system, should be a primary consideration in the event of cockpit reconfiguration.
Simulator testing of such a system would be more appropriate and certainly more
economical at this time. The automatic checklist function is immediately applicable,
however, and this function might be progressively implemented on the airplane, one
parameter at a time.
4.3.3 KEYBOARD
The primary "keyboard" in commercial airplane cockpits is at present, and probably
will be for some time to come, the navigation system control head. The more flexible
and capable the navigation system is, the more instructions it requires, and the more
complicated the control head becomes. The language of navigation comprises nearly all
the letters of the alphabet, all the numbers, some kind of punctuation, and anywhere
from two or three to a dozen or more modes os , functional alternatives. Keyboard
complexity is only a manifestation of a more basic problem, however, which is that the
computer is designed for navigation and not for man-machine communication. But, in
this case, identifying the problem does not appear to help much in solving it. In
attempting to solve the problem there is even danger of making it worse, in that
assigning the computer an additional task, man-machine communication, may result in
a requirement for even more instructions from the human.
There are four general approaches to the man-computer communication problem, each
of which attempts to make the computer at least share the burden of communication:
1. Arbitrarily limit the flexibility and capability of the system
2. Reduce the number of instructions required by making each instruction more
meaningful
3. Reduce the number of keyboard controls by making each control capable of
performing many functions
4. Change the method of communication to one more familiar to or easier for the
human
Existing navigation system controls generally represent some form of the first two
approaches. The more limited systems offer only a few modes of operation, and
communication with the system consists simply of selecting a particular mode or option.
More complex systems attempt a compromise between system flexibility and control
complexity by requiring the computer to interpret different sets of instructions in
different ways. In essense, this is a "block programming" approach, as opposed to
word-by-word input. System capability is still limited to however many "blocks" the
computer is designed to accept. Additional disadvantages are that:
1. Inputs must be made in a precise order or format to be correctly interpreted, and
instruction sets usually involve a code which must be either known or looked up.
x
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2. flow to operate the system is not intuitively obvious. The operator must learn how
to use any particular system and, to be most effective, must understand how the
system works.
The third approach, multifunction controls, is receiving most attention at present in
that all three of the military services and virtually all major aerospnee companies are
developing or working with some kind of multifunction discrete control. Though the
methods of achieving it differ, the concept is that each of a given number of controls,
usually pushbuttons, can perform many different functions according to a defined logic
sequence in an associated computer program. The computer drives the control head as
well as the rest of the system, and the control head somehow displays the function of
each control at any given time to the operator. The operator can call up any particular
set of functions he desires, and the computer can request information by displaying a
set of functional alternatives. Because a large number of functions can be selectively
offered on relatively few controls, coded entries are unnecessary, and formatting
requirements are minimal.
Human factors research on multifunction controls is lacking, partly because hardware
suitable for research is lacking, Tests performed at Boeing (ref.27), AFFDL, and the
Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory (AMRL) indicate that a given task takes longer
to perform and requires more control operations with multifunction controls than with
dedicated controls. It appears possible to offset this disadvantage in the design of the
system by assigning functions to the computer wherever possible. Results of one
analytical study (ref. 28) show that essentially equivalent workload levels between
multifunction and conventional controls can thereby be achieved. No really significant
test of the concept has been made to date.
Advantages of multifunction controls are (1) a dramatic reduction in panel space
requirements, (2) optimum location for all controls involved, and (3) a means of giving
the computer part of the task. Disadvantages are that (1)control functions must be
performed via the computer, (2) all functions are not always available, and (3) a strong
possibility for operator confusion appears to exist. This last possibility sorely needs
research.
The fourth approach to man-computer interchange is to depart from the keyboard
concept and use a different means of communication. A simple form of this approach is
use of a joystick and cursor to designate navigation waypoints on a map display, rather
than keying waypoint designations or geographic coordinates via pushbuttons.
Cursor-laying is an effective means of target designation, but might be less effective for
navigational waypoint designation. Use of a joystick and cursor for flight plan entry or
modification would involve map slew and scale change operations not required for
target designation, and perhaps more difficult and less accurate than corresponding
keyboard operations.
A more dramatic departure from the keyboard for man-computer communication is
computer voice recognition and synthesis (VRAS). Voice synthesis is a well established
technology, but voice recognition is not. A VRAS system being developed by the Navy is
capable of a recognition vocabulary of about 250 words. The system has the
disadvantage of requiring not only carefully formatted, but also rather carefully spoken
22
kinstructions, and a relatively simple oeeration can require a five- or six-word sentence,
perhaps repeated. Even if the concept is acceptably developed, it is difficult to imagine
its application in commercial airline cockpits. Its potential advantage to the Navy is
Chet it would enable a single pilot to make weapons selections or whatever without
having to release either the throttle or the stick. A similar system is being developed by
Clio FAA to relieve air traffic controllers of time-consuming keypunch operations during
peak traffic periods (ref 29),
4.3.4 WORKLOAD
The quantitative assessment of aircrew workload remains a problem, even through
time-line analysis techniques have been shown to be remarkably accurate at predicting
varying workload levels. The mental or cognitive aspect of workload is the elusive
factor, though it has not been shown that the relatively gross methods of estimating
cognitive workload used for time-line analysis are unacceptably inaccurate.
McDonnell-Douglas in Long Beach is conducting a series of studies designed to yield
baseline cognitive data on types, frequency, and difficulty level of tasks.
A "new" method of workload measurement which appears promising is interpretation of
oculometer data, an approach currently being pursued by the Human factors Branch at
the NASA-Langley, Analysis of recent tests in an airline training simulator suggests
Chat oculometer data might yield an index of cognitive workload, if correctly
interpreted. It is clear that changes in scanning patterns, ranging from subtle to
significant, occur in conjunction with changes in reported workload. The nature of this
correlation is not clear, however, for several reasons, among which are: (1) both direct
and inverse relationshi ps between eye movements and workload level appear to exist,
and (2) the oculometer data itself reveals that pilot reports of activity are often
inaccurate. If the nature of this correlation could be established, the oculometer could
provide not only a valuable record of visual activity, but also a continuous, quantitative
indication of cognitive workload throughout any particular task. The primary
developmental requirements for this application of the oculometer are: (1) a valid
analysis technique, and (2) a corresponding computer program for appropriate data
reduction.
Honeywell has developed a physiological technique of comparatively evaluating how
much difference in operator effort and attention is required for two or more similar
tasks, i.e,, comparative "physical cost" The technique involves measurement of EKG,
muscle activity, and respiration rate, but these data are said to be treated differently
than they would be for classical stress assessment. If the technique does, as claimed,
measure the compensation provided by the test subject in an experimental task, it could
be very valuable. Task performance measures in comparative experimental tests are
often inconclusive simply because the test subject works harder in one case than in the
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other to achieve a personal standard of performance, Performanee differences do not
appear until the subject is physically unable to compensate for the greater difficulty of
one of the two tasks. Honbywell's technique is said to be sufficiently sensitive to
discriminate between two similar formats of the same display.
4.3.5 COLOR DISPLAYS
Color offers two advantages in displays: operator appeal and a means of information
coding. The utility of operator appeal is difficult to qunntify, and thus also difficult to
justify economically. The utility of color as a coding dimension can be quantified, and
test results show generally that the utility of color is highly dependent on the nature of
the task (ref. 30). Color is not significantly more advantageous than achromatic codes,	 ..
such as shapes, symbols, and alphanumerics. It is obviously valuable as another coding
method where other achromatic codes are already "used up." When applied as one of
several codes, however, color can actually interfere with extraction of information from
a display.
At present there does not appear to be a demanding application for color in electronic
displays for commercial aircraft. Color is already used in the cockpit as a background
code for caution, warning, and equipment status, and its use is perhaps best confined to
those applications. It can be remarkably effective when generated artificially and used
to enhance contrast for sensor displays (ref. 15). If an imaging sensor is tested as a
low-visibility landing display, this application of color should be explored.
4.3.6 IMAGE QUALITY
The Office of Naval Research and the Air Prlc. Aerospace Medical Research
Laboratories both support R&D in the area of display image quality assessment, and
AMRL does some of this work internally. The goal of the research is, generally, to
achieve a quantitative description of image quality and thus an analytical tool for the
design of imaging systems and prediction of operator performance. Most of this work is
aimed at improving sensor-aided target acquisition, but one program at Virginia
Polytechnic Institute will assess the effect of - number of display variables on the
interpretability of raster-generated alphanumerics. None of this work a ppears of
immediate use to TCV. A research tool at VPI which Taight be of interest is the "eye
tracker," a high-frequency, con0inuous output oculometer which can indicate not only
where the eye is directed, but also where it is focused. In order for the machine to hold
track, however, the eye must remain within 1 cc volume.
4.3.7 FLAT-PANEL ELECTRONIC DISPLAYS
The cathode-ray tube displays in the TCV airplane represent a display system which,
though still accurately described as "advanced," is a mature and well-developer;
technology. Although CRT displays are not yet common as other than weather radar
displays in commercial transport airplanes, they are well represented in military
aircraft, bath as dynamic cockpit displays in attack airplanes such as the F-14 and A-6,
and as other crew station displays in larger aircraft such as the. P3 (ASW), B-1, and
E-3A (AWACS). In these applications, CRT's have proven to be safe, reliable, and
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teffective displays, Many current CRT applications employ an analog drive, but the CRT
is eminently applicable to a digital drive, and appears at present most likely to be the
basic display device for future digital avionics systems, such as the Air Force DAIS and
Navy AIMIS/AIDS.
The CRT is L-eing challenged for this role by several much newer technologies, all of
which may be generally described as "solid-state" or "flat-panel" electronic displays.
Within this family are light-emitting diodes !LED's), liquid-crystal displays (LCD's),
plasma or gas-discharge (GD) displays, and light-emitting films (LEF's), basically an
advanced form of the older electroluminescence (EL) technology, All these devices are
inherently digital, i.e., they are fabricated in element arrays and must be addressed via
an x-y matrix excitation, Herein lies a weakness, rather than a strength, however..
Large arrays, s-ich as the 512 x 512 normally used for TV, require the fabrication and
packaging of more than 1000 individual leads. In general, an array of in n
elements requires in n connections and line drivers. There are exceptions to this
requirement, and also methods of reducing the number of connections to less than
in n, but only by increasing the complexity and cost of the display driving circuitry.
By contrast, a CRT may be driven via a half-dozen or so connections at the most,
regardless of the number of "elements" in the "array."
The major advantages of flat panel over CRT displays are in space, weight, and power
requirements. Virtually all these displays can be packaged ao that their depth,
including driving electronics, is in th.- range of 0 to 10 em. Power requirements are not
easily generalized, bat none begins to approach the power requirements of CRT's. The
gas-discharge displays require the highest voltage, 200 to 300 V, but consume relatively
little power. LED's operate at logic-level voltage (5 V), but can require up to 70 mA each
for maximum brightness. LCD's also operate at low voltage (15 V) and require only
microamps of current.
All these solid-state displays are potentially capable of generating different colors, but
none has ae vet a "color TV" capability. In general, different colors are achieved by
changing the natural display color via deposited phosphors, but pure colors are difficult
to achieve in this way, and display brightness inevitably suffers. Brightness, however,
is primarily a means of achieving contrast in CRT's, and most solid-state displays have
inherent high contrast. In the passive, reflective LCD, contrast remains constant as
ambient light increases, and the display literally cannot be washed out by high levels of
incident light. In the dark, an auxiliary light source must be supplied. In addition,
LCD's suffer from relatively slow response time and have limited viewing angles.
Beyond these technologies are still others, such as electrochromics, which operates via
electrically induced chemical change, and electrophoretics, in which suspended
pigmented particles are electronically arranged and rearranged to make up the display.
At present, these are laboratory curiosities, much as are exotic devices such as
laser-generated displays, and even the TV-quality plasma and liquid-crystal displays
recently demonstrated. LED, plasma, and liquid-crystal displays for alphanumerics and
simple graphics have already arrived, not on3,y on watches and calculators, but also as
data displays and multifunction switch legand displays in advanced military aircraft
designs, Within the foreseeable future, the CRT will almost certainly have a viable
contender for dynamic, electronic cockpit displays in the form of a low-volume,
low-power, solid-state device,
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The CRT displays of the TCV B-737 offer the same or greater flexibility in symbol
generation as any of these devices. Developments in this area should continue to be
monitored, because significant improvements in solid-stato display technology could
accelerate the practicality of airline use of computer-generated, dynamic displays.
Unless a specific requirement for a new display surface is identified in the TCV B-737,
however, TCV evaluation of these devices does not appear warranted.
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C5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
za GENERAL
The following recommendations are made on the basis of both survey and analysis
information, and in consideration of the goals and resources of the TCV program, The
recommendations are presented in decreasing order of priority, with consideration given
also to economic and feasibility factors. Evaluation of the tactile display (see. 5.6), for
example, is not of "higher priority" than the acceeding recommendations, but rather
appears to be something which could be begun almost immediately because the basic
developmental work has already been done. Similarly, the VAM evaluation (see. 5.5)
should be performed, if at all, .,hire outside support is still available, All
recommendations are oriented to the TCV Crew Integration program. Recommendations
5.2 through 5.4 represent what is perceived as crucial for the success of the program:
(a) that TCV must document and communicate all activity relevant to research on and
evaluation o(' advanced transport operations; (b) that primary effort be devoted to
furthering the control/display research and development already begun in the program;
(c) that quantitative and comparative evaluation of these advanced flight deck concepts
be accomplished,
5.2 DOCUMENTATION OF ACTIVITY
•	 Identify, document, and distribute results of simulator and flight tests and human
factors problems encountered in test and evaluation operations.
The TCV program is uniquely capable of addressing problems foreseen in the real world
of terminal-area operations. It is also uniquely capable of identifying unforeseen
difficulties in this context, as they arise in the TCV B-737 operations. It is vital that
this type of information be distributed to others in the Geld who lack the resources to
discover or define such problems themselves, but who can contribute to the solutions of
problems, once identified, An active program should be established for rapid
documentation and dissemination of analysis, simulator, and flight test results, whether
positive or negative, conclusive or inconclusive. Similarly, an aggressive program for
collecting outside research and development results and ensuring their dissemination
within the TCV program is necessary, Maintenance and encouragement of continuous
technical interchange with others in the Geld is essential to accomplishing program
objectives.
Besides disseminating and publicizing results of TCV activity, consistent documentation
would promote a coherent systems approach to analysis of control/display tasks. At this
juncture in flight deck development, "breakthroughs" or even significant advances are
likely only via exploitation of new approaches to the division of work and responsibility
between the man and the machine. Progressively learning to apply the tremendous
computing and processing capability now becoming available holds the greatest promise
for achieving significant and lasting advances in commercial aviation. Without a record
of attempted improvements, including both rationale for tests and analyses of success or
failure, the significance of either any particular idea or results from any particular
evaluation is difficult to relate to long-range objectives. Such a record would not only
forestall repetiti-ve experimental efforts, but also would suggest, justify, and provide
guidelines for new efforts.
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XBecause many different individuals and organizations support and contribute to the
TCV program, such a documentation effort must be centrally administered and kept
simple. With respect to administration, it is recommended that:
1. A short flightitest summary report form be devised in an annotated outline format
2. A single individual be assigned to prepare and distribute the reports on an
aperiodic "event" basis
3. Only individual flight and simulator tests, and significant experimental and
analytical findings, both positive and negative, be summarized on each report (The
medium must not become a periodic "progress report".)
4. To expedite circulation, minimum formal approval be required prior to report
distribution (A suitable purpose statement and disclaimer should be included on
each report.)
5. Each report include a page or section encouraging readers to respond with
comments, questions, and accounts of related activity
6. A distribution list of appropriate organizations be prepared and maintained by the
individual charged with preparation of the reports
5.3 CONTROLIDISPLAY CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT
• Pocus primary effort on analyzing and developing control/display concepts,
particularly those currently implmented in the TCV B-737, which are designed
either to relieve the pilot of inner-loop control tasks or to simplify outer-loop tasks,
and thereby facilitate his functioning as system manager.
Examples of such currently implemented concepts and corresponding necessary
developmental work are:
Concept	 Development required
Velocity vector 	 Evolve display and control provisions to permit precise
control wheel	 achievement of desired velocity vector.
steering (CWS)
Automatic guidance
	
Make cisplay and control changes to improve control
and control system	 panel interpretability and operability.
(AGCS) control panel
Thrust management	 Devise a full time automatic (or semiautomatic) thrust
system	 management system compatible with manual and
automatic (light modes,
Two-, three-, and	 Identify manual techniques, control laws, and display
four-dimensional	 provisions for smooth and efficient path capture and
operations	 following, Identify information and situation display
requirements for three- and four-dimensional operation,
This work comprises several levels of machine assistance to the pilot, and is
fundamental to both validating the currently implemented concepts and to progressing
beyond these. Concepts other than the foregoing might be developed, but none has been
proposed which appears to offer the degree of pilot unburdening possible via velocity
CWS and automatic path guidance modes. Experimental development of these concepts
is essential both for accurate assessment of potential navigation and guidance benefits,
and for evaluation of secondary control/display concepts which inevitably interact with
these via demands on the aircrew's time and attention. Few, if any, other organizations
have the means to '' ,ovelop, test, and evaluate such concepts realistically. Some aspects
of this research program might be contracted to other agencies, but the bulk of the work
is necessarily a TCV B-737 effort.
The experimental development of primary AFD control and display concepts should be
of first priority. Until these primary capabilities are refined to optimum levels of
operational utility and efficiency, unnecessary effort and attention will be required of
the AFD pilots to perform primary control tasks, and these additional physical and
mental requirements will inevitably affect negatively other test and evaluation
functions performed. Any other flight deck evaluations that are performed prior to
optimizing AFD controls and displays should address relative, rather than absolute,
crew performance. Care should be taken that ail comparable aspects of the evaluation
are equally affected by the control/display implementation,
The continued development and refinement of control and display concepts incorporated
in the TCV B-737 is proper, highly desirable research and development activity, and is
not to be approached or regarded as avionics hardware development work. No other
research vehicle has or has had the capability to conduct actual flight operations using
a similar complement of advanced controls and displays. Unforeseen aircrew interface
problems experienced in the TCV B-737 operations are important research findings.
Such problems should be documented and their basis and possible solutions pursued as
primary program research work, as recommended in section 5,2
5.4 ADVANCED CONTROL/DISPLAY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
Quantitatively assess pilot performance for selected system tasks and aircraft
maneuvers using advanced displays and controls.
Quantitative performance improvement data for any advanced control and display
concept is a necessity if recommendations for commercial implementation of such
concepts are to be made. Baseline advanced electronic display system (ADEDS) and
CWS performance data is similarly necessary for comparative evaluation of control and
display concepts other than those currently under development.
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The traditionally slow process of new control and display implementation in transport
aircraft can be partly attributed to a lack of operationally derived comparative system
performance data. Quantitative performance data is normally either unavailable or
incomplete for new developments. What little data is available for existing conventional
implementations is usually deficient, thus making performance comparisons virtually
impossible. The cost to transport operators of implementing a change in the flight deck
is easily quantified, however, and this negative factur usually prevails, perhaps
justifiably, when weighed ngainst qualitative advantages and theoretical estimates of
improved performance.
Again, TCV is uniquely capable of contributing in this area. The flexibility and
versatility of the TCV B-737 make TCV potentially capable of providing both a
performance data base for conventional flight deck configurations and comparative
performance data for new flight deck concepts.The systematic accumulation of such data
is appropriate to TCV goals, and in addition, would be of immediate utility to the entire
transport aircraft community, operators, manufacturers, and researchers. Such a
program of continuous and progressive concept assessment would provide a focal point
for all flight deck R&D, would speed the implementation of worthwhile developments,
and would provide tangible evidence of the shortcomings of others.
As the first step toward quantitative performance assessment, routine two-man
operations from the AFD, as nearly full-time as possible, should be established as the
normal operational mode for all experimental flights. The utility of a secondary
monitoring and discrete control task in the AFD should be explored. The purpose of
such a task would be both to simulate subsystem control and display functions and to
provide a measure of attention given to such secondary functions during flight. The
secondary task should be designed on the basis of time-line data and validated by
comparative oculometer tests, probably best performed in the simulator.
The nature of the concepts to be evaluated, approp .ate experimental tasks, and the
parameters to be measured must be studied specifically, but some experimental
requirements may be inferred. Due to the time and expense involved in flight tests, the
number of experimental tasks in any particular test must be limited to two or three.
For the same reasons, classic experimental techniques such as counterbalancing
variables, use of many experimental subjects, and train'mg subjects to asymptotic
performance levels, cannot be used. To provide a common base for all test data, basic
parameters such as flight path deviation and control activity should be recorded for all
tests, in addition to other parameters specifically relevant to any particular test.
Initial tests should be designed to assess the contribution of individual aspects of the
AFD control/display system, and should be kept as simple as possible. For example,
comparative assessment of performance on a standard approach might be made for:
a	 Display versus no display of FPA and potential FPA
e	 Display versus no display of horizontal situation display (HSD) path prediction
vector
a Velocity CWS versus attitude CW5
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Each of these comparisons could be made in a three-variable test, and possible
interactions between variables could be assessed using a test matrix such as that shown
below.
For these and other tests, control modes and display content must be made harmonious
relative to the task and concept being tested. As data are accumulated, more complex
assessments may be made, such as system path following performance on curved or
segmented approaches. In such tests, it may be impractical or impossible to obtain
comparative data using more conventional instrumentation, but a quantitative
assessment of advanced system performance for such tasks would be valuable in itself.
An obvious requirement for this work is that the concepts tested be sufficiently well
developed to be fairly evaluated, hence the priority of the preceding recommendation,
"Control/Display Concept Development." Because the number of experimental subjects
and tests must be minimized, for reasons of time and cost feasibility, care must be taken
to avoid biasing results with inadequately developed or implemented concepts.
Similarly, the possibility of purely fortuitous superior performance will be increased in
such limited tests. Both test design and data analysis must be done especially carefully
with cognizance of these possibilities.
5.5 VAM EVALUATION AND HUD TEST PROGRAM
o Evaluate the visual approach monitor for curved and segmented approaches.
Define a simulation test program for test of a head-up display for both VFR and
IFR approach and landing.
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WCooperation and support from both Sundstrand Corporation and AFFDL has been
indicated for the VAM evaluation. Simultaneous evaluation of a PAFAM unit might be
done in the rear cockpit, if one could be obtained and if interface problems were not
prohibitive. Results of McDonnell-Douglas' PAFAM evaluation should be examined
before proceeding with tests on the TCV B-737, however.
Use of a HUD as a landing aid is an issue which has all tho earmarks of developing into
a CDTI-like problem in which great heat but little light is. generated. A rigorous test of
the HUD for commercial operations will be complicated and expensive, requiring a
visual simulator in which varying conditions of visibility can be represented, and
closed-loop approach and landing performed. The first step toward such an evaluation
should be a role-definition study and subsequent delineation of test requirements. 	 .^
A large amount of qualitative operational information is available from the military
and perhaps from British and European airlines which use a HUD. Some regional U.S.
airlines have purchased VAM's, and McDonnell-Douglas is evidently flight testing a
HUD on a DC-10. These sources might contribute data and perhaps otherwise support
or take part in the program. Operational information should be compiled and analyzed
for indications of relevant tests. Manufacturers of head-up displays and of military
aircraft should also be consulted for information and possible participation.
5.6 TACTILE DISPLAY EVALUATION
o	 Evaluate the tactile display concept developed at Ohio State University for
presentation of angle-of-attack and flare command. Investigate its utility for
presentation of other parameters as appears desirable and feasible.
This device has been shown to improve significantly the approach and landing
performance of student pilots. Experienced pilots have made under-the-hood landings
using the display, but no significant test or evaluation by experienced pilots has been
made. It is possible that an experienced transport pilot might find a qualitative
indication of angle-of-attack (AOA) command uniquely useful. Experienced pilots
probably would not "obey" the display, but might use it to either achieve or maintain a
particular AOA, and might also find it helpful for flaring the airplane. Such an
evaluation appears particularly suitable for the TCV B-737 where the qualitative AOA
and flare indications on the EADI could be compared with the tactile indications.
Results of this evaluation would have significance beyond the specific utility of the
tactile display itself. Use of AOA as a primary flight parameter in transport aircraft is
an oddly controversial problem. There is nearly universal agreement on the theoretical
utility of AOA to the pilot, but also universal reluctance to display AOA on the flight
deck. AOA is supplied as an input to transport autothrottle systems, but not to
transport pilots. Reasons for this lie in unknowns or uncertainties associated with
accurate presentation of the information, training of pilots in its use, and procedural
difficulties stemming from large aircraft operations in the presence of windshears and
turbulence. Because the tactile display provides a very simple presentation and requires
minimal pilot training, it offers a means of backirg into the problem. The utility of a
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visual raw-data display, or visual versus tactile command could be assessed. Whatever
results were obtained, the evaluation could provide a basis for a more comprehensive
and certainly a valuable investigation or all aspects or AOA as a primary flight display.
In addition to the AOA application, the tactile display may be useful for qualitative
presentation of virtually any single-dimensional parameter, thus unburdening the
visual channel. The concept might be applied as (a) throttle command based on time
error, or (b) direct-lift command based on flight path deviation. A two-dimensional
device is under development. If the single-channel device is evaluated favorably, the
two-channel version might then be tested, perhaps as a "head-up" indication and/or
command of vertical and lateral flight path deviations.
5.7 COCKPIT DISPLAYED TRAFFIC INFORMATION
r Define a simulation test program for CDTI functions. Test the display for use in
monitoring simultaneous independent approaches to close parallel runways.
Continue with other tests which appear desirable and are feasible.
The Boeing-PAA study of CDTI role concept formulation (ref. 25) has been completed,
and the document includes recommendations for experimental tests. It is reasonable to
assume that the FAA will encourage at least limited testing of selected roles. The
NASA-Ames and the NASA-Langley are logical choices for performance of some of these
tests.
Although it would be possible and in some ways advantageous to implement a CDTI
presentation in the research cockpit, simulator testing would be more cost effective.
Moreover, testing should focus not only on the possible advantages of CDTI, but also on
its potential weaknesses. Test subjects must be well trained in use of an HSD/electronic
horizontal situation indicator (EHSI) to avoid contaminating results with improvements
in performance that are due to learning and unrelated to the method of presentation of
traffic information. Both visual and nonvisual simulators will be required to investigate
differing use of the display in VFR and IFR conditions. A set of requirements for visual
simulation tests should be established, and the capabilities of the NASA-Langley in this
respect should be evaluated.
The most readily available sources of support for the study are those which were
involved in preliminary testing: Tufts University, MIT, and the NASA-Ames. AFFDL's
Terminal Area Control Office and Randolf AFB's Instrument Flight Center might lend
support, The University of Illinois and major aircraft manufacturers having suitable
simulators are other possible sources. Limitations of these resources are most likely to
be in their capabilities to realistically simulate traffic and in the availability of pilot
subjects experienced in the use of an HSD/EHSI.
5.8 KEYBOARD RECONFIGURATION
e	 Evaluate the potential of multifunction switching at the navigation control and
display unit (NCDU) for crew-computer communication.
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At present, the logical application for multifunction switching, if one exists, is at the
NCDU, the most complicated control panel on the flight deck, and a source of
significant workload, An evaluation of multifunction switching in the NODU would
indicate its potential for reducing both keyboard complexity and nircrew workload. In
addition, valuable information on future crew-computor communication tasks might be
gained.
The multifunction controls themselves will operate in whatever manner they are
programmed; hence, the functional design is critical to evaluation of the concept.
Maximum advantage of interface and processor logic must be taken to ensure both
natural progression of modes and functions, and minimum operator input requirements.
It is recommended that the evaluation be performed in the simulator, rather than in the
airplane, for two reasons: (1) currently available multilegend switches have low display
brightness and are adversely affected by vibration, and (2)test panel interface
requirements would be simpler in the simulato r. Favorable results from the simulator
test might encou rage development of flight-suitable hardware for a subsequent flight
test of the concept.
5.9 WORBLOAD EVALUATION AND VALIDATION
Continue development of the oculometer as an experimental tool.
Validate the time-line analysis program (TLA-2),
Evaluate the "physical cost" comparative workload evaluation technique for
possible use in future TCV operations.
The oculometer can provide valuable experimental data concerning the amount of visual
attention—frequency and dwell time —devoted to various displays and display areas. This
type of visual dots. is otherwise unobtainable, particularly since experimental subjects
are often unaware of, and thus cannot report, significant portions of their visual
activity. The work currently in progress at the NASA-Langley to develop (1) optimum
cockpit installations for the oculometer, and (2) an e ffective, flexible data reduction
program, should be continued on a high-priority basis.
In addition to providing a record of visual activity, the oculometer offers a potential
means of cognitive workload measurement, continuously determined, for any particular
task. Use of the oculometer in this application will require experimental development
and validation of an effective data analysis technique, as well as., an appropriate data
reduction program. Candidate analytical techniques ,,hould be based on known
physiological and psychological aspects of vision, perception, and cognition. Technical
support from specialists in these areas is recommended.
Validation of the TLA-2 workload program should proceed as planned. The purpose of
this program is to estimate and predict absolute workload levels; hence, the two
techniques are not redundant. McDonnell-Douglas has a comparable workload program
s
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and is pursuing a more precise definition of cognitive workload. Progress of this
endeavor is proprietary, but such information may be made available to the TCV
program if requested.
As discussed in the survey and analysis section (4.3.4), the "physical cost" comparative
workload technique could be uniquely valuable in the evaluation of rival configurations
or formats which are not sufficiently different to produce differences in measured
performance. This technique might also be useful for overall evaluation of very complex
tasks as well as tasks for which an appropriate performance measure is not easily
Identified. For example, it might offer a means of quantifying the "operator appeal"
factor in color displays, A first step must be tests of the technique itself to establish its
sensitivity and utility for airborne as well as simulator tests. AFFDL has indicated
interest in this work, and might lend support for further development and evaluation of
the technique.
5.10 STEREO DISPLAY EVALUATION
•	 Continue development of the stereo display concept. Compare the potential of two.
versus three-dimensional displays for information transfer.
The stereo display concept can apply to both computer-generated and imaging sensor
displays. Its potential for either application should be assessed via comparative
evaluation of information content and pilot subject performance.
The 3-D display development currently sponsored by TCV at McDonnell-Douglas should
be continued with the objective of performing a 3-D versus 2-D evaluation of the concept
itself, apart from associated airborne sensor systems. If results of the evaluation
indicate a significant advantage for 3-D displays, either further development of the
McDonnell-Douglas approach or test of the Honeywell PLZT-goggles system should be
pursued. Neither of the two approaches appears amenable to realistic closed-loop
simulator testing. Thus, the advantage of the concept should be definitely established
before embarking upon installation and test of such a system on the airplane.
A 3-D display system, similar to Honeywell's, was built by RCA for Johnson Space
Center for possible use on the Space Shuttle. This system is not currently in use at
Johnson Space Center, and might be available to TCV,
5.11 IMAGING SENSOR EVALUATION
• Investigate the feasibility of performing a ground-based evaluation of
imaging-sensors in low visibility, including the potential of image enhancement
and stereo display techniques.
Despite the objections to an imaging sensor landing display, the idea of showing the
pilot an actual view of the ground remains attractive. Results of the AFFDL evaluation
of the Texas Instruments Ka-band radar ILM will be published soon. The device itself is
available, and Texas Instruments might support its consignment to the TCV program.
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The display device itself, as well as the rest of the system, would be required, because
the presentatiun is not TV compatible. Another sensor system possibly available to the
program is the Hughes FLIR, described in section 4.2.3.
Neither of thase devices is recommended for evaluation on the TCV B-737 because of
the hazard involved with making experimental approaches in actual low visibility. More
relevant tests of each might be made iu some other vehicle, such as a truck, for
purposes of low-visibility turnoff and taxi assessment. Testing both at the same time
would be particularly revealing:
Dual-sensor integration and generation of artificial color for image enhancement should
be pursued via a low-level study effort. Westinghouse, Corberonles, and others in the
target acquisition display field might provide support.
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6.0 SYNOPSIS Or RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 PRIMARY PROGRAM EFFORT
The following three recommendations are seen as fundamental to the TCV program and
as critical to its continuation and success,
6,1.1 DOCMAENTATION OF ACTIVITY
The TCV program has, in the TCV B•737, a unique capability for discovering
unforeseen operational problems, as well as for addressing such problems in the
real-world environment. It is vital that ,rCV experience and test results be disseminated
to others in the field. An aggressive technical interchange effort will benefit TCV as
well as others. To promote this interchange the TCV program should identify,
document, and distribute results of simulator and flight tests and human factors
problems encountered in its test and evaluation operations.
6.1.2 CONTROLIDISPLAY CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT
The guidance, control, and display concepts currently implemented in the TCV B-737
must be improved via experimental test and evaluation toward an optimum level of
harmony and operational utility. This work is necessary not only to eventually achieve
reliable performance measures for the advanced concepts themselves, but also to ensure
that concurrent and future studies of other flight deck concepts are not biased by
unnecessarily difficult primary flight control tasks. This concept development is
fundamental to successful TCV B-737 operations, and is in no sense commercial avionics
system development.
6.1.3 ADVANCED CONTROL/DISPLAY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
ASSESSMENT
Pursuit of the basic objective of the TCV program—to develop, evaluate, and
demonstrate improved systems and procedures—requires a systematic and quantitative
assessment of aircrew performance using new procedures and advanced controls and
displays. Again, TCV is uniquely capable of obtaining reliable system performance
improvement data for such new concepts. Such data can provide the only realistic
means of trading system cost against system performance in the real-world
environment.
6.2 SECONDARY CONCEPT EVALUATIONS
Each of the following represents a relatively well-developed candidate concept for TCV
flight test or simulator evaluation.
6.2.1 VAM EVALUATION
A systematic evaluation of the role and utility of the Visual Approach Monitor for
r.
t
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commercial terminal area operations would he valuable both in itself and as data
relevant to the general head-up display question. The TCV B-7037 FFD is configured for
the VAM, and support is available from Sunstrand Corp. and perhaps from AFFDL also.
6.2.2 'TACTILE DISPLAY EVALUATION
A tactile display concept, developed at Ohio Statc University. has been shown to
improve significantly the landing performance of student pilots when used to present
angle-of-attack command. The device is potentially capable of presenting any
single-dimensional parameter, and thus of unburdening the visual channel by one item.
Angle of attack is not currently displayed in transport cockpits. 'rest of a "conditioned"
gnd easily interpreted angle-of-attack tactile signal would be relevant to both the
tactile display evaluation and the : grger general question of angle-of-attack display on
the flight deck.
6.2.3 KEYBOARD RECONFIGURATION
Hardware, software, and experience exist for performing a simulator evaluation of
multifunction controls as a means of both simplifying the navigation system control
head and improving man-computer communication. A multifunction control head
fabricated for this evaluation could then be reprogrammed for other applications, and
would provide a useful optional capability in the simulator.
6.2.4 WORKLOAD EVALUATION AND VALIDATION
The TLA-2 workload analysis program should be validated by comparing predicted and
actual time requirements for significant flight deck evolutions in both the airplane
(FFD and AFD) and the simulator. Such validation is necessary if the program is to
provide reliable and therefore useful data in the future.
Evaluate the comparative "physical cost" workload assessment technique. Determine its
sensitivity and potential for use in TCV experimental operations.
6.2.5 STEREO DISPLAY EVALUATION
The stereo display concept appears to offer a needed third dimension in cockpit displays.
Fundamental tests of 3-D versus 2-D displays should be conducted to determine how
much and what kind of additional visual information, if any, can be extracted from a
stereo display. The possibility of future cockpit tests should be considered when
establishing display parameters and experimental tasks for these tests.
6.3 STUDY AND ANALYTICAL EFFORTS
These recommendations require study and analysis before actual flight or simulator
evaluation is undertaken.
6.3.1 HUD TEST PROGRAM
The utility of a head-up display for transport aircraft is a question for which there is
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little or no relevant experimental or empirical data. Actual test of the head-up display
concept for approach and landing use is needed, but such testing must be carefully
planned. Information relevant to the HUD in the commercial role should be compiled
and analyzed with the aim of eventually defining I-IUD test requirements.
6.3.2 CDTI WORK
The cockpit dispinyed traffic information concept has progressed beyond preliminary
test and evaluation, and now is ready for more involved and complex testing.
Simulation test requirements should be defined, and the capabilities of available
simulators evaluated with respect to such requirements.
8.3.3 OCULOMETER DEVELOPMENT
The oculometer is potentially useful as an experimental tool which can provide (a) a
record of visnal nrt,ivity, (b) an indication of cause and effect relationships, and (c) a
measure of cognitive workload. Its application for all three purposes requires
development of suitable data reduction methods. For workload measurement, an
analysis technique must be developed as well.
6.3.4 IMAGING SENSOR EVALUATION
A short feasibility study should be conducted prier to embarking on this evaluation. The
object of the study should be to determine equipment availability, manpower, time and
cost requirements, locale, method of approach, and provisions for image enhancement, if
any. The object of the evaluation itself should be to establish the capability of imaging
sensore to penetrate rain, snow, fog, and haze.
t
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